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DOES EMBEDDEDNESS REDUCE INNOVATION AND 
DIFFERENTIATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE JAPANESE 




While strategic management scholars and institutional theorists regularly debate 
the merits of organizational differentiation and innovation vs conformity and 
embeddedness, few studies have sought to empirically investigate how these seemingly 
opposing forces impact each other. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, we 
contribute to closing this research gap by exploring how post-entry embeddedness 
impacted innovation and survival among de-novo and de-alio entrants into the Japanese 
microbrewery industry. Our findings indicate that post-entry embeddedness has 
contrasting effects, reducing overly non-conformist strategies among de-novo entrants, 
but enhancing non-conformity among de-alio entrants. These results indicate how 
institutions can serve as enablers of innovation, rather than constraints, through their 
dissemination of standards, norms and industry practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long recognized that new industry entrants are crucial for 
promoting economic growth and new innovation. Even as incumbents become ossified 
and inertial, new firms push the envelope of existing products, norms and strategies; in so 
doing they discover novel technologies and practices. The willingness and ability to 
undertake explorative and non-conformist behaviors that diverge from industry standards 
is thus a hallmark of the dynamic and innnovative new entrant. At the same time, 
however, the long-term survival of newly entering firms hinges crucially on their level of 
legitimacy and social acceptance (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Faced with a liability of 
newness, recent entrants and young firms that fail to gain institutional support and 
external legitimacy often fail. Consequently, embeddedness in social, political and 
economic contexts has been extolled as central determinant in the survival of new 
entrants (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
There is considerable support for both the notion that innovatvion and differentiation 
(Barney, 1991; Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Kondra & Hinings, 1998; Porter, 
1991), as well as local embeddedness (Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Jack & Anderson, 
2002; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986), enhance the survival and success of entrepreneurs. 
Taken together, however, the two approaches reveal a puzzle. While embeddedness 
enhances survival, it often does so by inducing a certain degree of isomorphism and 
conformity with prevailing practices and behaviors. Such conformity, however, would 
appear to be the quintessential opposite of the non-conformity and explorative strategies 
that underlie the behaviors of innovative new entrant firms.  
Although previous studies have recognized this paradoxical need for both legitimacy and 
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non-conformity, the vast majority of extant work juxtaposes embeddedness and non-
conformity against each other, arguing for the primacy of either one or the other 
(Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; Zaheer, 1995) or the need for balancing the two (Deephouse, 
1999). Few researchers, however, have looked at how the two forces interact, i.e. how 
different levels and types of contextual linkages impact the propensity for non-
conformist action and, by extension, organizational survival. In particular, little if any 
research has explored the dual effects of embeddedness and non-conformity in the case 
of innovative new entrants. This is an especially relevant research gap, given that new 
entrants face higher demands for both external legitimacy and strategic differentiation, 
than incumbent firms. 
This paper seeks to shed light on this under-researched area by exploring how 
embeddedness impacts the level of product non-conformity among entrants into the 
Japanese microbrewery industry. We do so by dividing the effects of embeddedness into 
pre and post-entry. By pre-entry embeddedness we denote the external linkages and 
networks the organization forms prior to its market-entry; for de-novo entrants such pre-
entry relationships and ties may be due to founders’ previous experiences (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990) while diversifying de-alio entrants carry with them the capabilities 
and networks formed in related industries or fields (Klepper, 2002). While no new 
entrant is a complete tabula rasa, the extent and nature of pre-embeddedness differs 
among firms; some firms may have nothing more than general networks and ties, while 
others are characterized by industry-specific experiences and relationships. An initial 
question we seek to answer is hence how different levels and types of pre-entry 
embededness impact the propensity for non-conformist innovation strategies. 
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Post-entry embeddedness is in turn defined by the social linkages and networks that 
organizations form after market-entry; these may include membership in industry 
associations, alliances, tacit knowledge sharing agreements and common procurement 
links.  While pre-entry embeddedness may not necessary be industry specific, post-entry 
linkages will most likely exert greater influences on organizations in terms of the norms, 
practice and standards they pursue. A second question we ask is hence how increased 
levels of embeddedness, formed after entry, impact the degree of non-conformist 
innovation strategies.  
Based on qualitative interviews as well as a comprehensive dataset covering 330 
breweries over the complete 15 year life-span of the industry, we examine the different 
effects of pre-and post-entry embeddedness on Japanese microbrewer’s penchant for 
product non-conformity and survival. Our findings suggest that greater degrees of pre-
entry embeddedness in industry-related networks, logics and technologies limits 
differentiation and non-conformity; in particular, we find that it has a negative impact on 
the ability to absorb new tacit knowledge from other organizational fields. However, 
post-entry embeddedness has a dual effect, reducing non-conformity in previously 
weakly embedded actors but increasing the level of exploration and non-conformity in 
heavily embedded actors. Post-entry relationships and networks thus serve as coalescing 
mechanisms, clustering organizations around specific behavioral norms. This clustering 
in turn increases the propensity for survival. 
We have chosen to focus this study on the Japanese microbrewery industry because it 
holds several unique traits that make it a suitable empirical venue; we thus begin this 
paper by providing a brief background portrait of the empircal research site. We 
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subsequently return to theory, deriving and nesting hypotheses within the context of the 
brewery industry. Our methods, results and discussion sections report on the analysis, 
central contributions and further avenues for research. 
EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND: THE JAPANESE JI-BEER INDUSTRY  
The Japanese microbrewery industry is a suitable empirical setting to investigate 
our research question for several reasons. To begin with, our choice of venue controls for 
population and industry level aspects of legitimacy. Aldrich & Fiol (1994) have noted for 
example that new entrants in emerging industries face not only questions about their 
organizational legitimacy, but also about the constitute and cognitive legitimacy of the 
new industry as a whole. Previous scholarship indicates this has certainly been the case 
among microbrewery industries in other countries that evolved through grass-roots 
movements and the gradual evolution of new identities (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000, 
Lamertz, Heugens, & Calmet, 2005).  
By contrast, the Japanese microbrewery industry was created in one fell swoop through a 
top-down process. In 1994, the Japanese government lowered the minimum requirements 
for annual beer production from two million liters to 60,000 liters. The move was part of 
the government’s plan to encourage entrepreneurship in local prefectures beset by 
recession due to Japan’s ongoing financial crisis. The tax authority was a particularly 
vocal supporter of the new industry as it hoped to increase revenues in local branches. 
Indeed, local tax offices were often co-owners in new ventures. Moreover, a number of 
breweries took the form of public-private partnerships with local municipalities, cities 
and prefectures joining forces with private businesses to launch breweries. Japanese rural 
prefectures were already dotted with local rice wine makers, known as ji-zake, many of 
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which dated back several hundred years, and the government’s goal was to create a beer 
equivalent; thus arose the ji-beer industry. From its very inception, the ji-beer industry 
captured the attention and support of the local population; an advantage of our research 
venue is hence that any legitimacy effects that we observe can be assumed to be firm-
specific, rather than industry-driven. 
Experimentation in the absence of tradition: Product non-conformity in brewing 
strategies 
A second reason for focusing on the Japanese microbrewery industry is that it 
offers a compelling venue for studying non-conformity, specifically in the form of 
variation in beer-types. Beer is brewed using four basic ingredients: water, yeast, hops 
and grains. These ingredients can however vary widely; malt, barley, wheat and rice can 
for example all be used as the grain ingredient. The taste and character of hops vary 
significantly based on regional affiliation, type and production format, while yeasts can 
be either slow or fast fermenting. Many beer types also contain additional ingredients, 
such as fruits or herbs; consequently there are an almost infinte number of possible recipe 
permutations. 
In many regions and countries with long histories of beer production, strong cultural 
norms, and in some cases even formal laws, limit the extent to which breweries can 
experiment with new recipes. The Japanese microbrewery industry, by contrast, had no 
such limitations; while the first microbreweries were formed in the 1800s, regulations 
passed after World War 2 reduced production to five large commercial brewers. Like 
most national producers, these brewers limited their product offerings to the light and 
fast-fermenting lager-type beers; as the popularity of these beverages grew during the 
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post-war era, the Japanese consumer market developed very strong norms and 
assumptions about beer, as embodied in typical mass-market lagers like Asahi Super Dry 
and Kirin Ichiban Shibori. 
The Japanese microbrewery industry, however, saw itself as the very antithesis of this 
mass-market approach to beer. Drawing on pre-existing images of the regional ji-zake 
rice wine industry, new brewers came to be viewed (and also viewed themselves) as 
artisans and craftsmen; ji-beer, or craft beer as it was often called, came to symbolize a 
pure product, closely linked to local produces and regional tastes. As one brewer noted: 
“Up until now, Japan has not had real beer…we wanted to make a beer that 
was genuine, that uses the local produce that we have here…to utilize our pure 
water…” 
Inspired by meeting with new beer types in Europe and North America, many 
brewers wanted to create what they called “real” beer. At the same time, however, they 
also wanted their products to mirror unique regional traditions from Japan. Driven by this 
pathos for alternative types of beer, the new breweries began to produce a wide array of 
styles. Many of these, like pale ales, weissen, dunkels and stouts, were adopted from 
breweries in other countries, including North America, Europe, Australia and even Sri 
Lanka. Other recipes were homegrown, utilizing local strains of hops, yeast and grain, 
including rice. Brewers also experimented with new taste sensations, giving rise to the 
likes of milk-beer, chocolate-beer and scallop-beer.  
Due to the relative lack of pre-existing norms and tradition, as well as the strong 
emphasis on divergence away from lager-type mass-market beers, the Japanese ji-beer 
industry was characterized by a significant amount of experimentation and product non-
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conformity, making it an ideal venue for exploring our underlying research objectives. 
The venue is also fitting because like microbrewery movements in other countries 
(Lamertz, Heugens, & Calmet, 2005), the organizational identities of Japanese ji-beer 
makers were strongly tied to the beer types produced. While product differentiation is 
merely one aspect of firm strategy in most industries (c.f. Miller & Chen, 1996), the 
brewery industry thus constitutes a unique case where products are closely linked to 
organizational identities and strategies (Durand, Rao, & Monin, 2007; Rao, Monin, & 
Durand, 2003). 
Brewer capabilities and competencies: foreign and local knowledge acquisition 
The considerable amount of experimentation in new beer types also points to a 
third advantage in studying the brewing industry: it controls for firm-specific skills or 
assets that might impact the ability to adopt non-conformist strategies. As noted 
previously, the main goal of this paper is to investigate the effects of social context, in the 
form of embeddedness, on strategic decisions; we thus seek to highlight the willingness to 
adopt particular product strategies, as opposed to the underlying capability to do so (c.f. 
Jonsson & Regnér, 2009). An emphasis on the microbrewery industry enables this 
approach first of all because there are few if any technical barriers to producing novel 
beer types; as noted previously, beer brewing requires few ingredients and brewers can 
simply mix in new ingredients and experiment as they see fit. 
Naturally, the ready availability of ingredients and technologies does not necessarily 
translate into immediate competency; like any other complex product, successful beer 
product relies on tacit knowledge, routines and practices accumulated over time 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In many European countries, for 
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example, breweries rely on centuries worth of experience and know-how. As noted above, 
however, the modern Japanese microbrewery industry is only 15 years old, hence there 
was little in the form of pre-existing norms or tacit knowledge to guide (or inhibit) 
differentiated production strategies. Instead, the new Japanese brewers sought to transfer 
knowledge from abroad by visiting Europe and North America, as well as by inviting 
foreign brewers to Japan to educate local staff. Several brewers also sent staff to study at 
formal brewing schools, both in Japan and overseas. Many of these students 
subsequently shared their knowledge not only with their home-brewery but also with 
other producers, ostensibly with the motivation to increase the quality and capabilities of 
the industry.  
Like in any industry, Japanese microbreweries exhibited heterogeneous capability levels, 
skills and knowledge. These variations, however, were limited by the short history of the 
market, as well as the ready availability of tacit knowledge in the form of foreign study 
trips and domestic learning. Consequently, the main differences in non-conformist 
product behavior should be found in the social context and networks in which breweries 
were embedded, rather than in their individual brewery-specific capabilities. 
Characteristics of Japanese microbreweries: De-novo vs de-alio entrants 
The breweries entering the ji-biru industry were characterized by significant 
variation in their origins and pre-histories; some were newly started breweries, others 
diversified from unrelated industries. Sake brewers also constituted one larger group, as 
did restaurants, pubs and other entertainment establishments. Previous work on 
organizational performance in new industries has drawn a distinction between de-novo 
and de-alio entrants (Carroll, Bigelow, Seidel, & Tsai, 1996; Klepper, 2002). We apply a 
 11 
similar classification scheme, based on the level and type of pre-industry embeddedness. 
De-novo entrants were characterized by low pre-entry levels of embeddedness in 
industry-specific networks; members of this group included start-ups dedicated 
specifically to the ji-beer industry, as well as new divisions of pre-existing firms 
diversifying from completely unrelated industry segments, including motorcycle parts, 
fishcakes and construction equipment.  
A common trait among de-novo organizations is that they were almost always founded 
by individuals with limited personal experience of beer but a strong pathos for brewing. 
In the case of new startups, the founders of de-novo breweries had quit previous 
employment and invested substantial amounts of their life savings into the new ventures. 
The non-related diversifying companies that entered microbrewing were in turn often 
small family-based enterprises, where the CEO or owner was dedicated to beer 
production. Many of these entrepreneurs thus saw brewing not as a business opportunity 
but as a life-calling or passion.  
The de-alio entrant segment in turn included current and former sake-makers, as 
well as restaurants and hotel establishments. While none of these organizations (including 
sake makers) had direct knowledge of beer brewing, they did have significant 
relationships to brewery-related networks and organizations, including liquor stores, bars, 
brewery equipment makers and alcohol licensing offices. They also had related goods and 
direct contact with potential customers through their existing businesses. As a result, they 
enjoyed a considerably deeper level of industry-specific embeddedness than the de-novo 
entrants. 
Like de-novo entrants, brewers at de-alio firms exhibited an interest and pathos for beer 
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production; however, their entry into the business was often equally motivated by purely 
economic concerns. Many of the ji-sake makers for example chose to enter the 
microbrewery segment due to falling sales in their main stay product and its lack of 
popularity among younger generations. Similarly, restaurants, bars and hotels hoped the 
creation of their own homegrown brews would increase overall customer sales. In sum, 
de-novo and de-alio entrants thus differed not only in their levels and types of 
embeddedness, but also in their motivations for entering the new industry. 
Macro-level trends and puzzles of the ji-biru industry 
The considerable top-down institutional and political support enjoyed by the ji-
beer industry meant that there were a large number of new entrants in the industry’s 
initial years, yet few exits. As indicated in Figure 1 below, over 250 breweries were 
registered between 1994 and 1998, yet only two of these exited the market. This period 
also saw a wide range in the types and styles of beers introduced onto the Japanese 
market. Change began to sweep the market in 2000, however. As the novelty of the 
industry began to wear off and the Japanese economy stumbled, an increasing number of 
breweries went out of business. By 2009, a total of 355 breweries had been founded, yet 
133 of these, close to 40%, subsequently exited. 
--- Inset Figure 1 here ---- 
With a unique combination of industry-level sociopolitical legitimacy and support, 
but few specific norms and traditions to guide individual organizational behaviors and 
strategies, the Japanese ji-beer industry thus appears to have been characterized by 
significant non-conformity and differentiation. At the same time, it also experienced a 
high level of attrition and failure. The question we ask in this paper is how these factors 
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inter-relate with the new entrants’ levels of embeddedness. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: EMBEDDENDESS, NON-CONFORMITY  
AND ORGANIZATIONAL SURVIVAL 
Differentiation and innovative non-conformity in new entrant strategies 
Scholars have long noted that entrepreneurs and new entrants are crucial for 
continuous innovation and growth. While incumbent firms may grow large and inertial 
due to ossified routines and practices, the relative lack of pre-history of new entrants 
enable them to innovate and explore new ground. By doing so, new entrants thus act as 
important catalysts for industry-level change, an insight shared by both strategic 
management scholars (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Moran & 
Ghoshal, 1999), and institutional theorists (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; 
Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Zucker & Darby, 1997). 
For new entrants, however, the emphasis on differentiation is not only an advantage but 
also a necessity; with pre-existing assets, networks and market positions, incumbent 
competitors often constitute significant threats to the survival of new entrants (Caves & 
Porter, 1977). Overcoming these threats requires differentiation and the identification of 
niche-positions that are more easily defendable against incumbent attacks and, thereby, 
more profitable (Porter, 1991). Consequently, textbooks in strategic management 
regularly extol the virtues of innovation and differentiation among new entrants. 
Partially as a result of this usage context, however, terms such as innovation and 
differentiation have come to identify successful entrepreneurial departures from pre-
existing industry standards, products and strategies. This selectivity ignores the fact that 
the majority of new firms’ attempts to diverge end in failure. Consequently, a more 
appropriate terminology for the study of new-entrants’ attempts at truly innovative 
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actions is non-conformity (c.f. Miller & Chen, 1996). Non-conformity in particular 
highlights how the novel actions of new entrants are fundamental departures from 
established routines, norms and strategies of the industries. The term hence encompasses 
both the eventual successes (i.e. innovations and differentiation) and failures (i.e. 
illegitimate deviations) of such norm-breaking behaviors.  
Notably, without the willingness to diverge from pre-existing practices by taking non-
conformist actions, new entrants will be unable to identify the market niches and unique 
positions that can enable their survival. While differentiation and innovation are positive 
outcomes, the willingness and ability to take non-conformist action is an underlying 
necessity for firms entering new markets and also the primary variable we explore in this 
paper. 
Embeddedness and new market entry 
In entering pre-existing industries, new firms are at risk not only from the 
predatory strategies of incumbent firms; they also suffer from a lack of networks, 
relationships and industry-specific knowledge. Because of this liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965), new entry survival depends not only on the willingness to take non-
conformist action, but also on attaining a minimum level of legitimacy and acceptance in 
the local market (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). As Singh, Tucker & House (1986) have shown, 
such legitimacy is primarily achieved through linkages to external social actors and 
contexts, including industry associations and field-level norms and practices, as opposed 
to developing unique internal capabilities and skills. 
Embeddedness in the external environment increases new entrants’ chances of survival 
firstly because it grants them access to networks and relationships that act as conduits for 
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social and technical learning, tacit-knowledge acquisition and inter-organizational-
alliances (Elenkov, 1997). While these positive effects of embeddedness are evident for 
all organizations, they may be particularly important in the case of new-entrants. In 
entrepreneurship research, Jack & Andersson (2002) show for example how 
embeddedness not only fosters survival through legitimacy, but also enables new firms to 
access and leverage crucial resources and markets. Sorenson and Audia (2000) in turn 
demonstrate that regional clustering effects observed in new innovative start-ups (e.g. 
Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in Boston) can be explained by emphasizing 
the social benefits of establishing a new firm in close proximity to innovative contexts. 
From a sociological perspective, however, embeddedness is also crucial because it 
affords the firms cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 
1995). By linking themselves with pre-existing firms and institutions, innovators and 
new entrants not only establish a minimum necessary level of legitimacy and status, they 
also expose themselves to isomorphic pressure for adopting institutionalized norms and 
behaviors. In doing so, new firms take on the organizational forms, practices and 
behaviors of incumbent firms, thereby increasing chances of survival (Suchman, 1995). 
Embeddedness vs non-conformity 
Embeddedness and non-conformity in organizational repertoires, practices and 
strategies are hence both crucial for new firm survival and success. The paradox, however, 
is that the two theories proffer quintessentially opposite organizational behaviors. 
Embeddedness engenders legitimacy by compelling organizations to adopt prevailing 
field and industry-level norms, strategies and logics. The very definition of non-
conformity, however, is to deviate from pre-existing taken-for-granted practices. 
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In recent years, a number of studies spanning the threshold between strategy and 
organization theory have focused in particular on these competing effects. The majority 
of this research has found that strategic decisions are often subsumed and driven by 
norms and practices of the larger institutional context. Jonsson and Regnér (2009) find 
for example that finance companies with strong linkages to pre-existing practices, norms 
and power structures were less likely to adopt deviant new mutual fund products (see 
also Jonsson, 2008). Palmer & Reger (2001) in turn explicate how elites embedded in 
pre-existing networks were unwilling to entertain the notion of new financial techniques 
in the U.S. mergers and acquisition wave of the 1980s. Ahmadjian & Robbins (2005) 
find that Japanese firms with stronger ties to local constituencies were slower to diverge 
from accepted human resource practices. While diverse in their focus, all of these studies 
highlight the role that pre-existing norms, routines and institutional linkages have on the 
willingness to adopt differentiated actions. In particular, industry-specific embeddedness 
had a negative effect on organizations’ willingness to adopt deviant behavior. 
As noted above, new-entrants to the Japanese ji-beer market differed markedly in their 
level of embeddedness; while all entrants had some degree of sociopolitical legitimacy 
thanks to the political and popular support for the industry, some of the newcomers also 
had considerable ties to industry-specific networks, assets and institutions. Sake makers 
for example already had relationships to liquor stores and other distribution networks 
such as restaurants and pubs; they also had pre-existing networks with local tax 
authorities and brewery licensing boards, as well as equipment manufacturers and 
industry associations. Restaurants and hotels similarly had ties to food and drink 
establishments and distribution networks. They also had considerable knowledge access 
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to the end-customer and their needs. By contrast, newly formed breweries and firms 
diversifying from unrelated businesses such as autoparts and construction exhibited little 
if any pre-existing embeddedness in industry-specific networks, institutions or practices. 
Drawing on this we hypothesize: 
H1: The product strategies of de-novo entrants will exhibit greater levels of non-
conformity and differentiation than those of de-alio entrants. 
Post-entry legitimization processes and non-conformity  
Significantly, embeddedness is not a fixed state but a variable condition; outsiders, 
fringe organizations and new entrants can thus take pro-active steps to increase their level 
of local network connectivity and linkages. These legitimization strategies include 
obtaining necessary regulatory and legal approval, joining industry associations, 
increasing interaction with similar organizations and taking part in public industry 
arrangements (c.f. Singh, Tucker & House, 1996). Organizations also attain legitimacy by 
employing professionals and experts; while these individuals enhance capabilities and 
skills, they also act as agents of institutions (Scott, 2001), essentially transferring norms 
and practices from one organization to another. 
All of these legitimization strategies were evident in the Japanese microbrewery industry. 
Initial entry into the market required a brewing license that was obtained after inspection 
from the local tax authority. A large number of brewers subsequently joined industry 
associations, including the Japan Microbrewery Association, the Japan Craft Beer 
Association and various regional support groups and knowledge-sharing organizations. 
In order to promote the development of the ji-beer industry, these groups arranged beer 
festivals and competitions, introduced quality assurance labels, educated and sanctioned 
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official beer tasters and published guides to beer production techniques and recipes. 
Japanese microbrewers also established co-operative links on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis, separate from the overarching industry association. In particular, many of the older 
breweries would provide support and guidance to younger breweries starting up. While 
this help was sometimes technical in nature, it often centered on extended discussions 
about new recipes and the latest developments in the brewery industry. Breweries also 
provided advice and help about how to deal with other related aspects of the business, 
including how to deal with tax authorities, distribution networks, licenses, etc. Notably, 
these collaborations were rarely one-time events but rather ongoing relationships, with 
breweries meeting up once or twice per year to share information. As one brewer noted: 
“We meet about once a year, it’s a good way of sharing information and 
knowledge, and to get to know the other brewers…we’re all friends in this 
industry…” 
The post-entry embeddedness strategies of firms can first and foremost be seen as 
a form of learning; in particular, the primary goal of the industry associations as well as 
the bilateral relationships was to promote the standards and quality of the beer industry. 
As one brewer we spoke with noted:  
“…consumers bunch all ji-beer brands together, so we have to make sure that 
everyone is good, otherwsie we all suffer…” 
At the same time, however, learning constitutes not only the acquisition of 
specific knowledge and capabilities, but also the transfer of tacit norms and practices that 
underpin taken-for-granted institutions and behaviors. In the nascent ji-beer industry, with 
its lack of pre-existing standards and norms, this aspect was particularly important. 
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Having learned their craft from a wide variety of sources, brewers we spoke to often 
expressed competing views on what constituted “real” beer. 
Consequently, the industry associations, competitions and organizational ties acted as 
arenas for institutional contestation (Schneiberg & Soule, 2004) in the identity and 
definition of the Japanese ji-beer industry emerged. Over time such contestations serve to 
cement specific norms and practices, thereby enforcing greater isomorphism and 
conformity. These forces are particularly evident in the case of the ji-biru industry where 
brewers were exposed to coercive, normative and mimetic pressures for institutional 
alignment. Put differently, greater embeddedness through legitimization and learning 
exposed brewers to forces for isomorphism. 
An increase in the pressures for isomorphism would suggest that non-conformist 
behavior is limited as firms become more involved in local industry associations, 
contests and increase their level of inter-organizational ties. This would particularly be 
true for firms with low levels industry-specific embeddedness pre-entry; as their 
involvement in local institutions increases norms, logics and assumptions are transferred, 
enticing them to reduce their non-conformist behavior. We thus have: 
H2a: Post-entry embeddedness, legitimization and learning will reduce non-
conformity, and thereby decrease differentiation, among de-novo breweries. 
By contrast, an interesting question is what effect the level of local involvement 
has on new entrants with significant pre-entry industry linkages. Because of their pre-
existing embeddedness, many of these actors have been relatively more exposed to 
industry norms and practices. The Japan Microbrewery Association, for example, is 
largely comprised of sake-makers; consequently, local involvement and increased 
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interorganizational relations may only have marginally limiting effects on these actors’ 
product repertoires. 
Instead, increased interaction with industry associations and local actors may have the 
opposite effect on brewers with significant pre-entry industry-specific embeddedness. 
Miller and Chen (1996) find for example that airlines with more heterogeneous networks 
are more likely to adopt non-conformist strategies than those with limited linkages; from 
this perspective, an increase in local ties should raise the level of non-conformity among 
pre-embedded entrants. By interacting with local industry associations and increasing 
their interorganizational ties, sake-makers, restaurants and other brewers with significant 
pre-entry levels of embeddedness would raise their level of differentiation and non-
conformity to coincide with industry norms and standards. Taken together, we thus have: 
H2b: Post-entry embeddedness, legitimization and learning will increase non-
conformity, and thereby also increase differentiation, among de-alio breweries. 
Pre and post-entry embeddedness, product non-conformity and survival 
The focus on differentiation strategies and embeddedness not only in this paper 
but other studies is largely motivated by the need to understand why and how new 
entrepreneurs survive. In fact, the majority of studies on new entrants, especially in 
organization theory, employ survival as the dependent variables (Carroll et al., 1996; 
Singh et al., 1986; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Several of these studies have focused 
on how pre-entry organizational characteristics, including embeddedness, firm-specific 
capabilities and local linkages, impact the risk of exit from the industry. In their study of 
the U.S. automobile industry, Carroll et al (1996) found for example that de-novo 
entrants lacking pre-entry networks, embeddedness and preparation were at far greater 
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risk for exit than de-alio entrants. As Klepper (2002) notes, the assumption that pre-
embedded de-alio entrants outperform de-novo firms is firmly established in the literature.  
This insight can also b extended to the case of the Japanese microbrewery industry; 
while start-up breweries and un-related diversifying actors had little in the way of 
industry-specific assets and networks, sake makers and restaurants had significant pre-
entry linkages to important resources, logics and sources of legitimacy. We thus have: 
H3: De-novo breweries will be at greater risk for exit than de-alio breweries 
As noted previously, increased levels of interaction and local linkages by new 
entrants with little pre-existing embeddedness can be expected to reduce their levels of 
non-conformity by exposing them to industry-level norms and practices. By contrast, an 
increase in local learning and legitimization activities on the part of sake brewers and 
other actors with pre-entry embeddedness may well increase their levels of product non-
conformity, for the same reason. As noted previously, the reason for these opposing 
effects is that local learning and organizational interaction has an isomorphic effect on 
breweries, essentially coalescing their product strategies around similar norms and 
standards. Through this clustering process, local learning and organizational ties increase 
isomorphism and hence survival. We thus have: 
H4: Involvement in post-entry legitimization and learning, in the form of industry 
association membership and inter-organizational ties, will decrease all brewers’ 
risk of exit. 
Figure 2 below offers a graphical description of our hypotheses. In the following 
section we discuss the methods, models and results of our empirical analysis. 
--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
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METHODS AND DATA 
Like previous studies comparing de-novo and de-alio entrants (Carroll et al, 1996; 
Klepper, 2002), our goal was to identify and include all Japanese microbreweries founded 
after the deregulation in 1994. Because of the industry’s relatively young age and lack of 
strong central institutions, no standardized yearly overview of the industry exists. Instead, 
we were forced to construct and verify an original data sources using a wide variety of 
sources. We began by coding information on 225 breweries from Nippon no Ji-biru 
(ASCII, 2007) [Japan’s Regional Beers], the most comprehensive guide to the industry 
currently available. Nippon no JI-biru provided information on the age of the breweries, 
geographic location and product portfolio; in many cases it also provided information on 
whether organization had engaged in local learning, foreign acquisition of knowledge as 
well as organizational background. To verify the data and check for unidentified 
breweries, we searched publications in major and regional newspapers, as well as 
specialized beverage newspapers and other industry-related publications. We also 
conducted an exhaustive 6 month search of company webpages, fan sites and internet 
blogs.  
A drawback of this search process is the risk for sample bias as small and unknown 
breweries are founded, operate and exit without being reported. An advantage of the 
Japanese ji-biru industry however is that its early popularity led to considerable interest 
on the internet; as a result, we were able to track down information on even the smallest 
one-person breweries.  
Moreover, because the industry was founded with the government’s explicit aim of 
promoting regional economic growth, local prefectural newspapers devoted significant 
coverage to new breweries. In many cases, these accounts included interviews with 
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founders and brewmasters, information on product line-ups, the origins of recipes and 
technologies, as well information on linkages to other brewers. In addition, the 
Shokuryou Shimbun, a twice-weakly newspaper with national circulation, devoted 
specifically to the food and beverage industry, published regular articles on the number 
of new microbrewery based on statistics from the government tax authority which 
handles brewing licensing.  
Dependent variables 
Product non-conformity. Product non-conformity, our initial dependent variable, 
was operationalized by constructing a ratio that measured how unique each brewer’s 
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∑  is the 
total number of beers of type i produced by all N microbreweries in existence during the 
particular year. This ratio was calculated for each beer type produced by the brewery and 
subsequently summed for all the beer types to arrive at the measure of non-conformity. 
As an example, if brewery A produced 2 ales and 3 weissen, and there were currently 
eight ales and three weissen in existence, its non-conformity ratio would be (2/(8+2)) + 
(3/(3+3)) = 0.7. The higher the value, the more non-conformity the brewery exhibited in 
its level of product non-conformity. 
In our hypotheses, we argue that local embeddedness may impact the degree and level of 
non-conformity; consequently, the non-conformity measure needs to be based on product 
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data from after firms have joined local industry associations and engaged in 
interorganizational networks. Ideally, this would call for panel data, detailing product 
strategies for each year, but this was not available. To catch the effects of local 
embeddedness and maintain validity of the findings, we instead calculated the non-
conformity ratio using product data published after firms had joined industry 
associations and established cross-brewery relationships; effectively, this constituted the 
latest available product data for each of the breweries. 
While our measure of non-conformity is admittedly coarse, the goal of this paper is not 
primarily to measure when or by how much local embeddedness impacts non-conformity, 
only if it does so at all, and in which direction. Consequently, we argue that the 
operationalization as presented above is a sufficient measure of product non-conformity. 
Exit. Our second dependent variable, survival, is employed in the event history 
analysis. This variable takes the value of 1 if a brewery exits in that year, 0 otherwise. A 
brewery is dropped from the sample after it has experienced an exit. Notably, an exit 
event does not always constitute failure or a negative – in many industries exists may 
significy acquisition, IPOs or MBOS. In the case of the Japanese microbrewery industry, 
however, all exits constituted failure and withdrawal from the market, either in the form 
of the microbrewery division of the company, or in the form of exit by the entire firm 
through bankruptcy. 
Independent variables 
De-novo vs De-alio entrant. We used a dummy variable to code for the type of 
brewery entrants. Specifically, de-alio entrants such as sake brewers, restaurants and bars 
that had considerable industry-specific networks, relationships and logics at their disposal 
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were coded as 1. De-novo entrants, such as new start-ups and unrelated diversifying firms, 
exhibited little if any industry-specific embeddedness and were thus coded as 0. 
Post-entry embeddedness. As argued above, new-entrants came into closer 
contact with the norms and practices of the microbrewery industry by joining industry 
associations such as the Japan Microbrewery Association, taking part in beer 
competitions and networks with other brewers. Drawing on data from various sources, we 
coded participation in each of these segments. Following Singh, Tucker & House (1986), 
we coded this data into a dummy variable: organizations were coded as 1 if they 
undertook any kind of local embeddedness in the form of JMA membership or 
interorganizational ties and 0 if they did. 
Control variables 
Both survival and product differentiation may be driven by the level of 
competitive intensity in the market; consequently, we control for population density in 
both models. We coded for regional affiliation using a dummy for membership in any one 
of Japan’s 7 primary regions, however, since these dummies were not significant in any 
of our analyses, we did not include them in the final analyses. We control for age with a 
variable for date of entry into the industry. In our qualitative interviews we found that the 
number of beers each brewery can produce is largely controlled by the size of their 
operations and the number of vats and brewery lines in use; consequently we use total 
number of beers (not types) as a proxy for organizational size.  
Analyses 
Since we were interested in the effect of embeddedness on product non-
conformity, as well as the subsequent impact of these factors on survival, we conducted 
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two separate analyses. In the first we used ordinary least squares to test the effect of 
embeddedness on non-conformity, controlling for age and number of beers. Although we 
collected data for region, we found that the regional dummy variables were not 
significant in the regression and so we excluded them.  
The sample used in this analysis consists of all breweries. We collected complete 
information for both embeddedness and differentiation for 107 breweries, and therefore 
the n is 107. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables are reported in tables 
1a and 1b below. 
--- Insert tables 1a and 1b here --- 
In our second analysis, we test the effect of embeddedness and non-conformity on 
the probability of exit. We use discrete time event history analysis, employing a logit 
model with robust standard errors to analyze the odds of exit during the period from 
1994-2008. This sample includes 129 firms. To maximize sample size, and minimize the 
problem of survivor-basis, we used the sample mean for breweries that were missing a 
measure of product-nonconformity, The risk set includes observations for each brewery, 
for each year of existence. Independent variables include embeddedness, product non-
conformity, year of entry into the industry, density (number of breweries in a given year) 
and year. We used robust standard errors to adjust for possible unobserved heterogeneity 
given the panel nature of the data. Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables 
used in the discrete event history analysis are reported in tables 1c and 1d below. 
--- Insert tables 1c and 1d here --- 
RESULTS 
The results from the OLS and logistic regressions are reported in separate tables 
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below. In each of the tables, the main effects are first included, followed by controls and 
interaction variables. Taken together, the results of the two models indicate that post-
entry embeddedness has distinctively different effects on non-conformity and survival, 
depending on whether organizations had pre-entry ties to industry-specific networks and 
assets. 
--- Insert Table 2 here --- 
Model 1 in Table 2 shows the main effects of pre- and post-entry embeddedness 
on product non-conformity. Contrary to H1, we find no evidence that de-novo entrants 
exhibit greater levels of product non-conformity. Model 2 includes an interaction between 
pre- and post-entry embeddedness. The main effects of both pre and post-entry 
embeddedness become significant, with a negative effect for pre-entry embeddedness and 
a positive effect for post-entry embeddedness. The interaction between the two is 
negative and significant. This indicates that when de novo is equal to zero, (in other 
words: for de alio brewers), post-entry embeddedness is associated with greater non-
conformity. For de novo brewers, on the other hand, adding the main and interaction 
effects, post-entry embeddedness decreases non-conformity. Thus, we find support for 
both H2a and H2b.  
Table 3 presents a simple comparison of means for product non-conformity for different 
combinations of pre- and post-entry embeddedness. For de novo brewers with post-entry 
embeddedness, the average produce non-conformity is .447. For de novo brewers with 
no embedded linkages, it is .732. The opposite is the case for de alio brewers, where 
post-entry embeddedness decreases the mean level of product differentiation. 
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
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Table 4 in turn presents the results of our discrete time event history analysis of exit.  
Model 1 presents the main effects of explanatory and control variables on exit. As 
predicted by H3, de novo brewers are significantly more likely to exit. Pre-entry 
embeddedness appears to have considerable benefits for survival. In contrast to H4, 
however, we find post-entry embeddedness also increases the average likelihood of exit 
for de novo and de alio brewers.  
Model 2 includes an interaction between pre- and post-entry embeddedness, Model 3 
includes an interaction between pre-entry embeddedness and product non-conformity, 
and Model 4 includes both interactions. The interaction between pre-and post-entry 
embeddedness is negative but not significant. It suggests that post-entry embeddedness 
has a different effect on de novo and de alio firms. The interaction between pre-entry 
embeddedness and product non-conformity shows a significant difference between the 
effect of non-conformity on these two categories of brewers. For de-novo brewers, in 
other words, brewers with low levels of pre-entry embeddedness, non-conformity is 
harmful, while for the de alio brewers, non-conformity actually seems to increase the 
likelihood of survival.  
--- Insert Table 4 here ---- 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis of the effects of embeddedness on non-conformity offer a range of 
insights, relating both to de-nov and de-alio firm strategies and performance, as well as 
the overall role of institutions in promoting, and limiting, innovation and exploration in 
new industries. 
De-novo vs de-alio strategies: pre-entry embeddedness and the willingnness to deviate 
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In contrasting the fates of de-novo and de-alio microbreweries, this paper follows 
several previous studies that have focused on differences in new entrants’ pre-entry 
experiences, networks and embeddedness (see for example Carroll et al, 1996 and 
Klepper, 2002). While detailed and highly informative in their own right, these studies 
have largely failed to account for how de-novo and de-alio strategies differ, focusing 
instead on final outcomes in terms of performance and survival. While other studies have 
explicitly linked culture, institutional embeddedness with strategy formation and 
decision-making (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Daniels, Johnson, & de Chernatony, 
2002), they have not addressed how differences in pre-entry embeddedness, experience 
and networks impact strategy formation. 
This paper thus makes a contribution by providing an initial glance into how de-novo 
and de-alio firms differ in their behaviors and strategies post-entry. In particular, our 
findings indicate that de-novo firms are more likely to adopt non-conformist strategies; 
we suggest that this is primarily due to their lack of embeddedness in industry-specific 
networks, practices and logics. De-novo entrants are, by our definition, either start-ups or 
diversifying firms from unrelated industries; as such they presumably enter the new 
industry primarily because they see it as an exciting opportunity, as opposed to market-
entry processes driven by uncertainty reduction and safety-in-number effects (c.f. 
Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Greve, 1998). From such an entrepreneurial vantage point 
not only are de-novo entrants more likely to adopt non-conformist strategies, they also 
face fewer pre-existing ties to restrict their behavior.  
De-alio entrants, by contrast, may see market entry as a strategic necessity (as in the case 
of sake brewers) or an incremental diversification (as in the case of restaurants and pubs). 
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Consequently, their willingness to adopt non-conformist strategies may be limited both 
by their own strategic motivations, as well as pre-existing networks and relationships. 
While extant work on de-novo and de-alio performance and survival has found 
overwhelming evidence that de-alio entrants are far superior to de-novo entrants, both 
Carroll et al (1996) and Klepper (2002) identify unique cases where de-novo entrants 
were able to outperform and outlive de alio firms. Both studies suggest these effects are 
driven by the specific capabilities of de-novo entrants. Controlling for capabilities and 
experience, our study suggests an augmenting argument, namely that individual de-novo 
entrants may outperform due to their willingness to take more non-conformist high-risk, 
high-return differentiated strategies. 
Post-entry embeddedness and non-conformity: competing or complementary effects? 
The underlying theoretical motivation for this study was the juxtaposition of two 
seemingly contrasting theories for new-entrant survival, one emphasizing non-conformity 
and differentiation, the other highlighting local embeddedness and conformity. In so 
doing, we reflect the larger debate between strategy scholars and institutionalists over the 
merits of similarity and differentiation. Ours is certainly not the first paper to investigate 
these opposing effects; the past few years have witnessed a number of highly fruitful and 
informative works that combine insights from both sides of the strategy-institutional gap 
(see for example Deephouse, 1999; Jonsson & Regnér, 2009; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). 
The vast majority of this work, however, is still characterized by the underlying view that 
institutional and strategic forces pull firms in opposing directions. Consequently, studies 
have generally tended to highlight how organizations balance institutional and strategic 
aspects (Deephouse, 1999; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) or how higher order institutional 
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factors impose contextual constraints on managerial strategies (Ingram & Clay 2000; 
Jonsson & Regnér, 2009).  
By contrast, our study suggests institutional contexts have a more refined, and important, 
role to play than simply strategic constraints. To begin with, the findings indicate that for 
some entrants, increased embeddedness and greater exposure to institutionalized norms 
may indeed have a dampening effect on non-conformity. We thus found that local 
embeddedness reduced the level of non-conformity among de-novo entrants. Counter to 
expectations, post-entry embeddedness had a negative effect on firm survival for de alio 
firms, and a neutral effect of the de novo firms. Post-entry embeddedess seems to have 
helped the de novo firms by putting a damper on their non-conformity. More research 
must be done to better understand the negative impact on de alio firms. 
Previous work would suggest these positive effects of embeddedness are primarily the 
result of greater legitimacy, as well as access to key input and output markets (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). While we do not deny that this may certainly 
be the case, it’s important to note that in the case of the Japanese microbrewery industry, 
firms already had substantial legitimacy (thanks to the top-down support and popularity 
of the industry) and that both input and output markets were readily available. 
Instead we suggest another effect, namely that embeddedness in local networks and 
relationships served to moderate excessive non-conformity, while promoting a more 
acceptable level of experimentation. As noted in the discussion, the willingness to 
diverge from pre-existing practices is a key aspect of new entrants, yet all deviance is not 
good deviance. After being exposed to institutionalized norms and practices, de-novo 
entrants that had previously lacked traditions or standards on which to base their 
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activities began to reign in their behaviors, effectively benchmarking acceptable 
standards of differentiation. Put differently, institutional exposure, in the form of 
embeddedness, reduced excessive non-conformity, even as it encouraged acceptable 
levels of differentiation. 
We find further evidence of this effect when considering de-alio entrants; as the findings 
indicate, these brewers were far less willing to undertake non-conformist production 
strategies. A central reason for this may have been their pre-existing networks, 
relationships and identities. For these sake makers, bar-owners and restaurants, the risks 
of non-conformity widely overshadowed the benefits; with their pre-existing linkages to 
industry-specific networks, de-alio brewers had considerable downside in the event 
product experimentations failed. As a result, it was safer to follow existing products and 
practices. 
When de-alio entrants increased their exposure to local industry associations and 
established linkages to other brewers, however, their level of non-conformity increased. 
The fact that greater embeddedness and exposure to institutionalized practices increases 
the level of non-conformity might at first appear counterintuitive. The notion does make 
sense, however, if we consider institutions as pillars of the social context that provide 
standards, norms and meaning that help organizations make decisions under uncertainty 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greve, 1998). In the case of de alio entrants, these norms 
and meanings emphasized a greater degree of non-conformity and diversification. 
The norms and practices that new entrants were exposed to thus served not as a wet 
blanket, limiting innovation and differentiation. Instead, embeddedness in local norms 
and practices refined organizational strategies, thereby extending the chances of survival. 
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The pressures for isomorphism thus served as coalescing factors, effectively gathering 
organizations around common assumptions of differentiation. In so doing, it reduced 
uncertainty both for de-novo and de-alio firms. It also provided meaning and social 
context to how Japanese microbreweries should compete and survive in the new industry. 
CONCLUSION 
The past 10 years have witnessed an increasing level of cross-collaboration 
between scholars from the new-institutional theory and strategic management. Our paper 
makes a contribution to this burgeoning literature stream by examining the dynamic 
relationship between normative conformity and differentiation among new entrants in an 
emerging industry. The focus on new industry entrants is of particular interest because it 
constitutes an arena where the competing effects of isomorphism and non-conformity are 
heightened. On the one hand, new institutionalists have long argued that entrants must 
acquire legitimacy through isomorphism and conformity in order to overcome the 
liability of newness and a general lack of embeddedness (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Singh, 
Tucker & House, 1986). In contrast, strategic management scholars have shown that new 
entrants can successfully compete with incumbents and survive by differentiation, 
carving out unique product and strategic niches beyond the reigning status-quo (c.f. 
Christensen & Rumelt, 1996; Porter, 1991). The need for examining these opposing 
approaches is further highlighted by the fact that both new-institutionalists and strategic 
management scholars view entrants as crucial catalysts for change and innovation (Caves 
& Porter, 1977; Chen & MacMillan 1992; Leblebici et al, 1991). To date, however, no 
work has sought to investigate this specific arena. 
We fill this research gap by exploring how local embeddedness impacted differentiation, 
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and ultimately survival, among de novo and de alio brewers in the Japanese 
microbrewery industry. Combining qualitative and quantitative data methods, we 
examined how varying levels of post-entry embeddedness impacted de novo and de alio 
entrants’ strategies for product non-conformity. Our results suggest that while de novo 
and de alio brewers differed significantly in their levels of product differentiation, post-
entry embeddedness and interorganizational linkages reduced these differences. 
Increased social interaction between the breweries thus had a clustering effect, 
coalescing organizations around a particular product differentiation norm, thereby 
enhancing survival. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
















Table 1a: Descriptive statistics, 107 breweries, cross-sectional sample 
  n mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
product non-conformity NONCONFORM 107 0.593  0.640  0.019  3.167  
de novo NEW 107 0.467  0.501  0.000  1.000  
total number of beers NUM 107 3.710  1.408  1.000  8.000  
year of entry ENTRY 107 1997.449  2.025  1995.000  2006.000  
post-entry embeddedness POSTEMBED 107 0.336  0.475  0.000  1.000  
 
Table 1b: Correlations, 107 breweries, cross-sectional sample 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 NONCONFORM 1.00      
2 NEW 0.05  1.00     
3 NUM 0.38  0.27  1.00    
4 ENTRY -0.37  0.21  0.10  1.00   
5 POSTEMBED 0.06  0.01  -0.06  -0.18  1.00  
 
Table 1c: Descriptive statistics, 129 breweries, 1994-2008, breweries at risk only 
  n mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Exit EXIT 1495 0.02  0.13  0.00  1.00  
de novo NEW 1495 0.43  0.49  0.00  1.00  
total number of beers NUM 1495 3.67  1.35  1.00  8.00  
year of entry ENTRY 1495 1997.16  1.70  1995.00  2008.00  
Density DENSITY 1495 252.20  43.23  31.00  278.00  
Year YEAR 1495 2002.83  3.80  1995.00  2009.00  
post-entry embeddedness POSTEMBED 1495 0.33  0.47  0.00  1.00  





Table 1d: Correlations, 129 breweries, 1994-2008, breweries at risk only 
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  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
1 EXIT 1.00         
2 NEW 0.06  1.00        
3 NUM 0.00  0.23  1.00       
4 ENTRY 0.01  0.14  -0.04  1.00      
5 DENSITY 0.04  0.01  -0.01  0.22  1.00     
6 YEAR 0.07  -0.01  0.00  0.24  0.44  1.00    
7 POSTEMBED 0.07  0.03  -0.03  -0.14  -0.04  -0.07  1.00   
8 NONCONFORM 0.01  0.03  0.36  -0.44  -0.18  -0.10  0.06  1.00  
 
Table 2:OLS regressions of product non-conformity, 107 breweries cross-
sectional sample 
  Model 1 Model 2 
total number of beers NUM 
.190***    
(.039)  
 .166***    
(.038) 
de novo NEW 
 .033     
(.110) 
.265*   
(.136) 
post-entry embeddedness POSTEMBED 
 .013   
(.112)  
 .286*    
(.148) 
year of entry ENTRY 
  -.133***   
(.027)  
 -.142***    
(.026) 




 -.608**  
 (.222) 
constant  
 264.86***   
(53.64)  
 284.04***    
(52.47) 
R2  0.32 0.37 
F  




n  107 107 *** p <= .001; **p<= .01; *p<.=05 (two-tailed tests for controls, one-tailed for hypothesized effects) 
 
Table 3: Comparison of means for product non-conformity 
 
post-entry 
embeddedness=1 post-entry embeddedness=0 
    
de novo .447 (.546) n=17 .732 (.660) n=33 




Table 4: Discrete time event history analysis of exits of breweries, 129 breweries, 
1994-2008, logit analyses with robust standard errors 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
total number of beers NUM 
 -.104   
(.164) 
 -.125    
(.163) 




de novo NEW 
 1.032**     
(.440) 
 1.968**   
(.821) 
 .082   
(.559) 
 1.112    
(.853) 
post-entry embeddedness POSTEMBED 
 1.112**   
(.421) 
  2.086**    
(.824) 
 1.390**  
 (.465) 
 2.448**    
(.850) 
product non-conformity NONCONFORM 
 .313   
(.274) 
.144   
(.329) 
 -.805*   
(.442) 
 -1.113*    
(.573) 
year of entry ENTRY 
 .019    
(.127) 
 -.021   
(.135) 
 .027    
(.135) 
 -.020   
(.142) 
density DENSITY 
 .045   
(.029) 
 .045   
(.029) 
  .045   
 (.029) 
 .045    
(.029) 
year YEAR 
.227*    
 (.099) 
 .227*    
(.099) 
 .233*    
(.098) 
.232*   
(.097) 




 -1.509   
(1.063)   
-1.668  
(1.053) 
de novo* product non-
conformity 
NEW* 
NONCONFORM   
1.629**  
(.548) 
 1.777 **    
(.609) 
constant  
 -510.49***   
(306.28) 
 -429.19    
(321.74) 
 -537.11**   
(320.65) 
 -439.791  
(335.841) 
pseudo R2  0.096 0.106 0.115 0.127 
Wald chi2  25.22 (7) 20.36 (8)  35.28 (8) 27.05  (9)  
n (firm years at risk)  1495 1495 1495 1495 *** p <= .001; **p<= .01; *p<.=05 (two-tailed tests for controls, one-tailed for hypothesized effects) 
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